Hedge funds are major players in the convertible securities market. In this paper we directly observe their involvement in the market for newly-issued convertibles and find that hedge funds provide 73.4% of convertible financing in the period [2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008]. Hedge funds are subject to less regulation than other investors and their business model is based on expertise in short-selling. When buying convertibles, hedge funds typically combine a long position in a convertible with a short position in the underlying stock. By buying newly issued convertibles and simultaneously creating short stock positions in the open market, hedge funds can effectively distribute equity exposure to well-diversified shareholders. We hypothesize that firms use the distributive ability of hedge funds as a substitute for a seasoned equity offering. We find strong evidence that firms choosing to issue convertibles have characteristics that make a seasoned equity offering expensive, and also have characteristics that reduce the cost for hedge funds to establish and maintain short positions. A higher fraction of a convertible issue is privately-placed with hedge funds when the issuer's stock return is more volatile and when the issuer has a higher probability of financial distress, which are characteristics increasing the cost of seasoned equity offerings. Hedge fund involvement also increases when institutional ownership, stock liquidity, issue size, limitations on callability and concurrent stock repurchases suggest that shorting costs will be lower. We further observe that virtually all convertibles in our sample are very equity-like, consistent with the convertibles being issued by 'would-be' equity issuers. We find that discounts on convertibles issued to hedge funds are not higher than the discounts on convertibles issued to other buyers, which is in line with hedge funds serving as relatively low-cost distributors rather than as investors of last resort. We further observe that hedge funds do not bear the costs of maintaining short positions for extremely long periods-on average no more than 13.38% of convertibles are still outstanding five years after they were originally issued.
Introduction
Convertible arbitrage hedge funds combine long positions in convertible securities with short positions in the convertible issuer's stock. These funds are subject to less regulation than other investors and their business model is based on expertise in shortselling.
1 Anecdotal evidence suggests that hedge funds are in fact a major player in the convertible security market. This paper directly examines the participation of hedge funds in convertible issues and establishes that the majority of the US convertibles issued during the 2000 -2008 period are initially purchased by hedge funds.
We construct a database of the initial buyers of 803 privately placed convertibles issued under Rule 144A. 2 Securities issued under Rule 144A do not require registration with the SEC, but they can only be sold in the secondary market with no lock-up period by the set of qualified institutional buyers listed in a registration statement issued after the original prospectus of the convertible. 3 The registration statement therefore provides a list of the original buyers in convertible security offerings. The data show that 73.4% of the financing of newly-issued convertibles in our data set is provided by hedge funds. 4 Virtually all convertibles in our sample are 'equity-like' in that the average convertible delta at the time of issue is 0.867. Only three of 803 issues have deltas below one half and only ten percent (twenty-five percent) of issues have deltas below 0.725 1 See Fung and Hsieh (1999) for a description of the regulatory environment for US hedge funds and explanations of how and why the trading behavior of hedge funds differs from other investors. 2 Private placements under Rule 144A represent the majority of convertible issues in recent years. For example, De Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren (2009) report that 95% of convertible issues during the 2003 -2007 period are privately placed. 3 Qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) are institutions with over $100 million in assets. 4 This confirms anecdotal evidence that about 70%-80% of convertibles are bought by hedge funds. A Financial Times article (Skorecki, 2004) states that in 2003 "some [convertible] bonds have been issued exclusively to hedge funds and on average they have been responsible for buying about 70 percent of new issues." A 2004 Wall Street Journal article (Pulliam, 2004) reports that "hedge funds play[ed] a big role in the roughly $600 billion convertible-bond market, which saw $97 billion in new issues last year. As much as 80% of those issues were bought by hedge funds, according to brokers who work on convertible-bond trading desks." (0.816) . A similar observation is made by Lewis and Verwijmeren (2009) and is consistent with firms issuing convertibles as a substitute for equity. The observation suggests the following possibility. Instead of issuing high cost equity, firms privately place convertibles with hedge funds. By shorting stock to hedge against changes in the stock price, these funds distribute the equity exposure to diversified investors in the open market.
By placing a convertible with hedge funds, a firm can receive financing today while avoiding the discounts and underwriter fees associated with a secondary equity offering.
Where those costs are higher than the costs associated with the private placement and the security is eventually converted, the firm will have issued equity at a lower cost. We find that hedge fund involvement in convertible issues is greater when the issuer is more financially distressed, when the issuer's return volatility is higher, and when the firm is listed on NASDAQ. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) , Corwin (2003) , and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) argue that these characteristics are indicative of relatively high costs of issuing seasoned equity.
The attractiveness of convertibles to hedge funds depends on both the cost of shorting the issuer's stock and on the design of the security itself. We find that hedge funds purchase a smaller fraction of a particular issue and comprise a smaller fraction of the buyers of the issue if the issue is callable. Call features complicate hedging since the decision to call is in the hands of the firm. A call will redistribute wealth between convertible-holders and stock-holders. This redistribution is not a hedgeable comovement of the bond and the stock and makes it more difficult to determine the optimal number of shares to short.
Hedge funds are also more involved in issues that are small relative to the market value of the firm's equity; i.e., when hedging the issues requires borrowing only a small fraction of the shares outstanding. This finding is also consistent with the ability to hedge being a determinant of involvement by hedge funds. We also find evidence that hedge fund involvement is positively related to concurrent stock repurchases. De Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren (2009) argue that these concurrent stock repurchases facilitate hedge funds in obtaining their short positions.
To further investigate the role of convertible hedge funds as distributors of equity exposure, we compare firms that issue convertibles to hedge funds to firms that issue seasoned equity. We find that firms selling convertibles are more financially distressed and have more volatile returns relative to seasoned equity issuers. The issuers of convertibles would therefore have faced high costs of issuing seasoned equity compared to those firms that chose to issue equity. In addition, convertible issuers have a higher average level of institutional ownership and have more liquid stock than firms that make seasoned equity offers. Institutional ownership facilitates the borrowing of stock to set up a short position (D'Avolio, 2002) , while stock liquidity also reduces the costs of establishing and maintaining a short position.
The paper makes two main contributions to the literature. Primarily, we document the role that hedge funds play as distributors of equity exposure. Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009) study PIPE (Private Investments in Public Equity) issues and conclude that hedge funds serve as investors of last resort for the issuing firms in that hedge funds "provide capital for companies that are otherwise constrained from raising equity capital" (Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm, 2009, p. 541) . 5 PIPE issuers are in general very small and distressed and provide large discounts to investors. The firms in our sample are substantially larger and are not as distressed, and issuing convertibles to hedge funds is unlikely to be their only financing option. Further, the convertible issuers in our sample do not issue bonds at higher discounts to hedge fund investors than to other investors.
Second, our paper investigates the matching of particular securities and a targeted group of buyers. The literature on this topic is scarce as the original buyers of new security offerings cannot typically be observed. One of the first major contributions in this field is Wruck (1989) , who focuses on private equity sales. Our hand-collected database allows us to study the original buyers of 144A privately placed convertible securities. We are able to show that both investor and investee identity matters in the convertible debt market in the sense that hedge fund involvement in an issue depends on characteristics of both the issuing firm and the security design. Prior studies have examined security design choice from the perspective of the suppliers of convertible securities. For example, Lewis and Verwijmeren (2009) argue that important motivations for design choices are earnings management, credit rating concerns, and reductions of taxes, refinancing costs, and managerial discretion costs. We add to these studies by viewing security design choice from the perspective of the suppliers of capital. We document a relation between the involvement of hedge funds and the incorporation of call features, cash settlements, call spread overlays, and put features into the convertibles' design.
5 PIPEs are private placements in which a public company issues equity securities to a group of private investors without registering the shares. PIPEs differ from traditional private placements because a registration statement is filed soon after signing of the purchase agreement, which allows for the resale of shares sold to PIPE investors (Chaplinsky and Haushalter, 2009 ).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior studies on convertible arbitrage and constructs testable predictions on the role that hedge funds play. Section 3 describes our data set and provides information on the proportion of convertible securities that are bought by hedge funds. Section 4 presents our empirical tests on the relation between hedge fund involvement and firm and issue characteristics.
Section 5 investigates the differences between firms with secondary equity offerings and firms issuing convertibles to hedge funds. Section 6 examines convertible underpricing.
We report additional analyses of hedge fund shorting in Section 7 and of the effective life of convertible bond issues in Section 8. Section 9 contains our conclusions.
Hedge funds and convertible arbitrage

Prior evidence
Hedge funds try to achieve an absolute return irrespective of the return on broad stock or bond indices, which makes short-selling a natural part of their strategy (Fung and Hsieh, 1999) . 6 Calamos (2003) discusses the typical buy-and-hedge strategy of buying convertibles and shorting the stock of the issuing firm with the short position being determined by the convertible's delta. Delta is the sensitivity of a derivative's price to small changes in the price of the underlying, and is between zero and one. A delta-neutral position attempts to exploit underpricing of the convertible security while hedging against changes in the stock price.
A first way in which prior studies have examined the prevalence of hedge fund purchases of newly issued convertibles is by focusing on short interest in the stock of the issuer. Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990) document that US firms with convertible debt outstanding report higher monthly short interest than other companies. 7 Choi, Getmansky, and Tookes (2009) document the effects of convertible arbitrage activity on market liquidity by using the change in monthly short interest around convertible issue dates as a proxy for arbitrage activity. They conclude that arbitrage activity increases the liquidity of the stock because arbitrageurs trade in the opposite direction to the market's movements: arbitrageurs add to their short position when the stock price increases (as an increase of the stock price increases the delta) and close out part of their short position when the stock price decreases.
The main downside of using short interest data to examine convertible arbitrage is that changes in short interest may be due to a belief that the share is overvalued. Fung, Loon, and Naik (2009) show that the returns of convertible arbitrage funds are positively related to the supply of convertible bonds and argue that an increase in the supply of bonds means an increase in the availability of mispricing opportunities to be exploited. Agarwal, Fung, Loon, and Naik also show that the returns of convertible arbitrage hedge funds can be largely explained as the return to a buy-and-hedge strategy.
Our data allow us to directly examine the involvement of specific hedge funds in specific convertible issues. For each convertible in our sample we are able to observe how much of the issue is purchased by hedge funds. In this particular sense, our paper is most closely related to Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009 (Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009, p.547) ).
Empirical predictions
Consider a firm that seeks to issue equity when an underwriter would be unwilling to bear a large exposure to the firm's equity unless the firm pays a substantial fee and/or offers a large discount on its shares. Such a firm may be able to use the comparative advantage of hedge funds to distribute equity exposure. Hedge funds engaged in convertible arbitrage are able to use their knowledge of the borrowing and short-sale market to hedge themselves while distributing risk to a large number of well-diversified investors. Issuing convertibles may allow 'would-be' equity issuers to raise capital at lower costs. Although an underwriter could also hedge by shorting stock, they may not have a comparative advantage at doing so and their marketing claims may not be seen as credible while they maintain a large short position in the shares they seek to place.
2.2A. Empirical predictions about the decision to issue a convertible
We predict that firms will issue convertibles to hedge funds when the costs of issuing seasoned equity are high relative to the costs of establishing and maintaining a short position. We use three main proxies for the costs of issuing seasoned equity. The first proxy is the firm's probability of financial distress, as the firm's financial condition is a strong predictor of the costs of issuing securities (Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli, 2007) . Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2005) show that underwriter spreads are higher for firms with higher leverage and lower profitability. Provided that the costs of establishing and maintaining a short position do not rise in a manner similar to the increase in the costs of issuing seasoned equity, firms with a higher probability of financial distress are more likely to choose to issue convertibles to hedge funds. Our second proxy is the return volatility of the firm's stock. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) and Corwin (2003) report that the costs of seasoned equity offers are significantly higher for issuers with more volatile stock returns. Provided that the costs of establishing and maintaining a short position are not comparably higher for more volatile firms, volatile firms are predicted to be more likely to issue convertibles to hedge funds. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) and Corwin (2003) also find that NASDAQ firms have substantially higher costs of issuing seasoned equity, even after controlling for variables like return volatility. We use a NASDAQlisting as a third proxy for the costs of issuing seasoned equity.
A potential fourth proxy for the costs of issuing equity is firm size as measured by the market value of equity. Evidence on the effect of firm size on the costs of issuing securities has however been mixed. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) and Corwin (2003) provide some evidence that larger firms have lower costs of issuing equity, while Gompers and Lerner (1999) find that issuing costs are positively related to firm size for venture capital-backed IPOs. Many other studies find no strong effect of firm size on underwriter spreads and security underpricing; see Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) for an overview of studies on the relation between various firm characteristics and the costs of issuing seasoned equity.
Just as certain firm characteristics may make a secondary equity offering more expensive, other characteristics of the issuing firm affect the cost of establishing and maintaining a short position. Since short sellers must pay cash in lieu of the dividend to the lenders of stock, the management of a hedge fund's cash flows may be more expensive when the convertible is issued by a dividend-paying company. Further, the difficulty of shorting shares depends on the ease with which shares can be borrowed.
D'Avolio (2002) finds that institutional ownership explains about 55% of the variability in loan supply across stocks. Since issuers with higher institutional ownership will have a higher availability of shares to be borrowed (see also Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005) , such issuers are more likely to find that issuing convertibles is cheaper than issuing seasoned equity.
All else equal, a would-be arbitrageur is more likely to be able to short the desired number of shares when that number of shares is small relative to the number of shares outstanding. When investigating the choice between issuing seasoned equity and distributing exposure via hedge funds we take as our measure of relative size the ratio of the issue proceeds to the market value of the equity outstanding. Similarly, the costs of establishing and maintaining a short position will be lower when the issuer's stock has greater liquidity and again the likelihood of a convertible issue in preference to a seasoned equity offering should be higher.
Conditional on the firm issuing a convertible, the attractiveness of the convertible to hedge fund investors versus other potential buyers is a second question.
2.2B. Empirical predictions about hedge fund purchases of particular convertible issues
When the cost of issuing seasoned equity is relatively high and the firm does decide to issue a convertible, it does not necessarily follow that the bond is more attractive to hedge fund buyers than to other investors in convertibles. But if the decision to issue the convertible was in part driven by an investigation of potential demand from hedge funds, then the same factors that predict an increased likelihood of a convertible issue relative to an equity issue will be associated with a higher fraction of the convertible being purchased by hedge funds. This will imply that the fraction of a convertible issue purchased by hedge funds should be higher when the probability of financial distress is higher, when the issuer's return volatility is higher, and when the issuer's stock has a
NASDAQ-listing.
There is a separate reason why hedge fund involvement may be higher when the issuer's return volatility is higher. Part of a hedge fund's profits can come from playing the role of a market-maker willing to buy stock after a stock price decline and sell after a stock price increase. When stock price movements are liquidity-induced and subsequently reverse, the fund's dynamic hedging strategy can be inherently profitable and hedging a more volatile stock involves more opportunities to trade.
Following the reasoning in subsection 2.2A certain issuer characteristics are predicted to make a convertible bond more or less attractive to hedge funds. Issues by dividend-paying companies are predicted to be less attractive. Higher institutional ownership and greater liquidity of the issuer's stock and a smaller relative size for the issue are all predicted to make a convertible more attractive to hedge fund investors.
When investigating the attractiveness of different convertible issues to hedge fund buyers we take as our measure of relative size the ratio of the delta-neutral short stock position to the number of shares outstanding.
Not only do particular characteristics of the issuer affect the relative costs of secondary offerings versus distribution via hedge funds, firms that do decide to issue convertibles should structure the issue so as to reduce the cost of establishing and maintaining a short position. There are two ways to do this: first, by restricting or eliminating the bond's call features, and second, by undertaking a concurrent share repurchase. Limits on callability increase the attractiveness of convertibles to hedge funds because funds need to constantly balance their long bond position with a short stock position. Call features complicate this balancing since the decision to call remains in the hands of the issuing firm. Whenever the occurrence of a call is not a deterministic function of the stock price and time, hedging will not be perfect.
A concurrent stock repurchase by the issuing firm will cater to the needs of hedge funds by allowing funds to short-sell borrowed stock at a predetermined price, namely the repurchase price. De Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren (2009) examine instances where firms combine convertible issues with stock repurchases (the combination is known as a Happy Meal), and conclude that convertible arbitrage explains both the size and speed of execution of these stock repurchases.
We predict that hedge funds will purchase a larger fraction of convertible bond issues with limited callability and a larger fraction of convertible issues accompanied by a stock repurchase.
Data and summary statistics
Most recent convertible issues in the US have been privately placed under Rule 144A: Marquardt and Wiedman (2005) [ please insert Table 1 here ] On average, a convertible issue is bought by 64 different buyers. Note that 64 × 803 is much larger than 4,335, i.e., many buyers are involved in multiple convertible offerings.
The number of buyers varies considerably over the convertible issues. Some convertibles 13 The registration filings are typically S-3/A filings, although in some cases the selling security-holders can be found in S-3, S-3ASR, or 424B filings. 14 There are three hedge funds in our sample that TASS classifies as "Global Macro" hedge funds, and an additional two hedge funds in our sample have the words "Global Macro" in their name. As global macro funds do not necessarily combine a long position in a convertible with a short position in stock, we have reestimated all the results in this paper with global macro hedge funds classified as non-hedge funds. We have also checked the impact of the classification of brokerage firms on our results, as one practitioner has suggested that brokerage firms possibly trade on behalf of small hedge fund clients. We find that our conclusions in the paper are robust to changing the classifications of global macro hedge funds and brokerage firms.
are bought by a single buyer and the maximum number of different buyers of a single issue in our sample is 320.
That less than half of buyers are hedge funds is not inconsistent with financial press reports that hedge funds buy 70% to 80% of all convertible issues. A typical hedge fund is involved in a larger number of different convertible issues than a typical non-hedge fund buyer of convertibles. Panel A of Table 1 [ please insert Figure 1 here ]
Hedge fund involvement has grown through time. The average investment by an individual hedge fund expressed as a fraction of the offering proceeds is 2.31% in the sample. The average individual non-hedge fund investor buys 0.82% of an issue.
We construct a final sample that we use to examine the relation between hedge fund involvement, security design, and firm characteristics. Following common practice we delete financial firms and utilities (112 issues). We also require that the issuing firms have data available on Compustat, CRSP and the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings database, which deletes an additional 62 observations.
Determinants of the fraction of a convertible bond issue acquired by hedge funds
In this section we examine the relation between the fraction of a convertible issue privately-placed with hedge funds and proxies for the costs of directly issuing seasoned equity and the costs of indirectly distributing equity exposure via hedge funds. The set of issuer characteristics examined include the likelihood of financial distress as measured by a firm's Altman Z-score (Z-scores are higher for firms with a lower chance of bankruptcy); the return volatility of the issuer's stock; a dummy for whether the issuer's stock have a NASDAQ-listing; firm size as measured by the market value of equity (in regression analyses we employ the natural logarithm of this variable); a dummy for whether the bond is issued by a company with dividend-paying stock; the percentage institutional ownership of the issuer's stock; the relative size 16 of the issue as a proxy for the fraction of the outstanding stock that would have to be sold short in order to hedge ownership of the entire bond issue; and the Amihud liquidity measure (a high Amihudscore denotes illiquidity).
The set of issue characteristics examined are those predicted in subsection 2.2B to be related to hedge fund involvement (i.e., callability and concurrent stock repurchases) plus other issue characteristics studied in Lewis and Verwijmeren (2009 [ please insert Table 2 here ] We find that differences in issuer characteristics are significant at the 1% level in three instances. Convertibles with above-median hedge fund involvement are significantly more likely to have been issued by firms with higher return volatility, 17 and by firms whose stock are more likely to be listed on NASDAQ. Both these characteristics are identified by Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) and Corwin (2003) as likely to increase the cost of a seasoned equity offering. The third significant univariate relation between issuer characteristic and hedge fund involvement is that hedge funds are more likely to buy only a minority of a convertible issue when the issuing firm is smaller.
When focusing on issue characteristics, we find that hedge funds have a significantly lower involvement in convertibles with a call feature and a significantly higher involvement in convertible issues accompanied by a stock repurchase. Both of these findings are in line with our predictions. 18 We further find that hedge fund involvement is significantly higher in issues with call spread overlays and issues with cash settlement features. 17 We measure return volatility as the annualized stock return volatility, estimated with ten years of monthly stock return data. In robustness tests we have measured volatility as the annualized daily stock return volatility over trading days [240, 40] relative to the issue date, as in Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1999) . The results throughout our paper are qualitatively unchanged. 18 We have collected more detailed call information for the callable convertible issues with an abovemedian hedge fund involvement. We find that only 4.9% of these issues have a time to first call of zero. The average (median) time to first call for these issues is 4.69 (5.00) years. As hedge finds can be expected to hold their positions for shorter than 5 years, many callable convertibles can still be treated as noncallable by hedge funds.
We draw our main conclusions from the multivariate analysis reported in Table 3 .
For ease of interpretation, Table 3 also sets out the predictions for the signs of the coefficients developed in subsection 2.2B. Some firms in our sample are responsible for multiple convertible offerings. 19 In line with recommendations of Petersen (2009), we therefore cluster standard errors at the firm level.
[ please insert Table 3 here ]
In Model 1, the dependent variable is the percentage of proceeds purchased by hedge funds. Firms that issue convertibles because they face high costs of directly issuing equity are likely to have first confirmed that demand from hedge funds is likely to be high. Thus a higher fraction of convertibles issued by relatively distressed, more volatile and/or NASDAQ-listed firms is predicted to be purchased by hedge funds. We find that hedge fund involvement is positively related to the likelihood of financial distress (low values for the Altman Z-score), and is also significantly higher for firms with high return volatility and a NASDAQ-listing. The attraction to convertibles issued by companies with highly volatile stock may also reflect an attraction to the trading profits from marketmaking while dynamically hedging. Note that a significantly smaller percentage of a convertible issue is purchased by hedge funds when the convertible is issued by a smaller firm.
Hedge fund involvement is predicted to be higher when the costs of establishing and maintaining a short position are lower. The significant relation between relative size and hedge fund involvement is in the predicted direction and, also as predicted, 19 The 629 convertibles in the sample are issued by 474 different firms: 364 firms issue a single convertible, 76 firms issue two convertibles, 26 firms issue three convertibles, 5 firms issue four convertibles, and 3 firms are responsible for five different convertible issues.
convertibles with call features are of less interest to hedge fund investors. We find some evidence (at the 10% level) that hedge fund involvement in an issue is positively related to the concurrent repurchase of stock. We find no evidence that hedge fund involvement is significantly higher when the firm pays no dividends, when more of the issuer's stock is held by institutions, or when the stock is more liquid.
Regarding the control variables, we find that cash settlements, call spread overlays, and put features are all positively related to the fraction of a convertible issue that is purchased by hedge funds. Lewis and Verwijmeren (2009) argue that cash settlement features and call spread overlays facilitate earnings management and that this may be important to managers whose bonuses are tied to reported earnings and/or to shareholders unable to see through reported earnings. 20 A potential explanation for the relation between these design characteristics and hedge fund involvement is that firms with relatively high costs of issuing seasoned equity are more likely to try to make their financial reporting look as favorable as possible. Put features provide investors with more downside protection than is typically associated with a convertible security. The positive relation with hedge fund involvement can possibly be explained by put features being issued by risky firms with high informational asymmetry, as these are firm characteristics that are likely to make a seasoned equity offering relatively expensive. 20 Cash settlement allows firms to decide whether payment will be in common stock or in cash (for the value of common stock). At the time of our study, accounting rules were such that the potential dilution associated with the offer is not reflected in fully diluted earnings for most cash settlements (see Lewis and Verwijmeren, 2009 ). Call spread overlays require a firm to use part of the issue proceeds to purchase call options on its own shares, struck at the conversion price, and write call options on its own shares at a higher strike price. The net effect is an increase of the strike price in the conversion option. Had the issuer simply offered the convertible bond with a higher conversion price, the interest offered on the convertible would have been higher and the firm would report higher interest expense.
In Model 2 we use the percentage of buyers classified as hedge funds as the dependent variable. This variable focuses on the number of hedge funds serving as distributors, instead of the size of their involvement. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained from Model 1.
Determinants of the decision to distribute equity exposure via hedge funds
In this section we will compare seasoned equity issuers to firms that issue convertibles to hedge funds. This analysis can shed more light on whether selling equitylike convertibles to hedge funds is indeed a substitute for 'would-be' equity issuers with relatively high costs of directly issuing seasoned equity. 21 We obtain seasoned equity offerings from the SDC database from January 2000 to March 2008. We impose the same restrictions as on our sample of convertibles; i.e., we delete financial institutions, utilities, and firms with missing data in Compustat, CRSP, or the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings database. Our seasoned equity sample consists of 2,198 offerings.
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We use a binary logit model to compare the firm characteristics of seasoned equity issuers to the characteristics of the 584 convertible issues in which hedge funds purchase the majority of the issue. Table 4 reports the results.
[ please insert Table 4 here ] 21 We are not the first to compare firms issuing seasoned equity to firms that issue convertible securities. For example, Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1999) study Stein's (1992) prediction that convertible debt issuers have significantly higher adverse selection and financial distress costs than issuers of seasoned equity. They find evidence in line with Stein's prediction and conclude that the likelihood of an equity-like convertible debt issue increases when the costs of a common stock issue are high. 22 A difference with our convertible sample is that not all our seasoned equity offerings are privately placed. In our sample of 2,198 seasoned equity offerings, only 2 offerings are identified by SDC as 144A private placements. The private placement information is missing for 1,412 of the seasoned equity offerings.
The dependent variable equals one for convertible issues in which the majority of the issue is purchased by hedge funds, and zero for seasoned equity offerings. We find that firms issuing convertibles to hedge funds are more financially distressed than equity issuers, as the Altman Z-score is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Firms issuing convertibles to hedge funds also have more volatile stock returns than equity issuers. We find an insignificant increase in the likelihood of issuing a convertible for firms listed on NASDAQ.
The results in Table 4 show that firms issuing to hedge funds are significantly larger companies with significantly more liquid stock and significantly higher institutional ownership than are firms that issue seasoned equity. Greater liquidity and higher institutional ownership make it easier for hedge funds to set up their desired short positions. Combined, the results of Table 4 suggest that firms choosing to issue convertibles to hedge funds rather than to issue seasoned equity are firms that face relatively high costs of directly issuing equity and also have characteristics that facilitate the establishment and maintenance of the short positions desired by hedge funds; i.e., that also have relatively low costs of indirectly distributing equity exposure via hedge funds.
Offering discounts
Convertible securities are typically issued at a discount (Ammann, Kim, and Wilde, 2003; Chan and Chen, 2005; Loncarski, ter Horst, and Veld, 2009; De Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren, 2009 ). Potential reasons for convertible debt underpricing include illiquidity and complexities associated with the valuation of hybrid securities (Lhabitant, 2002) . Studying these discounts allows us to distinguish the distribution role of hedge funds from their possible role as a last resort provider of finance. As distributors of equity exposure, hedge funds require a discount to cover their costs of shorting the underlying stock. But we do not expect a discount that is substantially larger than any discount on convertibles issued to other investors. Under the last resort hypothesis, we would expect higher discounts for convertibles issued to hedge funds. Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009) report that when the majority of a PIPE is sold to hedge funds the average discount is 14.12%, whereas the average discount is significantly lower (9.02%) when the majority of a PIPE is issued to non-hedge fund investors.
We follow Ammann, Kim, and Wilde (2003) [ please insert Table 5 here ]
Panel A of Table 5 provides a univariate analysis of the average offering discount.
The average offering discount on the 603 issues is 4.9%. As in Brophy, Ouimet, and
Sialm (2009), we distinguish firms in which hedge funds purchase the majority of the convertible issue from firms with a minority of hedge fund involvement. Firms with a majority involvement of hedge funds have an average discount of 4.8% on their convertible issues, while firms with a minority hedge fund involvement have an average discount of 6.1%. The difference between the two subsamples is not significantly different (t-statistic equals 0.510). The finding that the discount is not significantly higher for issues to hedge funds is evidence against the view that convertibles are sold to hedge funds as a last resort source of financing.
Panel B reports the results of a multivariate analysis. The dependent variable in
Model 1 is the offering discount and the primary explanatory variable is a dummy variable that equals one when hedge funds buy the majority of the security offering and zero otherwise. 25 We again find no evidence that hedge funds obtain higher discounts than other investors. In fact, discounts are insignificantly smaller when the majority of the issue is sold to hedge fund investors.
The control variables show that the offering discount on the convertibles in our sample is higher for firms with more volatile stock returns, for smaller firms, and for firms with more illiquid shares. We find that firms with a listing on NASDAQ provide lower discounts on their convertible offerings, all else equal, which is different from findings in the seasoned equity market. We also find that put rights have a strongly negative impact on our measure of the offering discount. This finding is sensible as MATLAB's convertible bond pricing algorithm does not take put features into account. In
Model 2 we re-estimate our model for only those convertibles with no put features attached. The results are relatively similar to those from Model 1 in that hedge funds do not obtain higher discounts than other investors.
Model 3 is a two-stage model. As the offering discount and the involvement of hedge funds could both be driven by a common unobserved factor, we also include the inverse Mills ratio. The first stage of the model consists of a probit model regressing the majority-hedge-fund-involvement dummy variable on the same set of issue and issuer characteristics examined in Table 3 . We calculate the inverse Mills ratio from the firststage estimation as in Heckman (1979) and include this ratio as an additional control variable in the second-stage regression.
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The relation between the offering discount and the involvement of hedge funds is again negative, and again statistically insignificant. Thus although hedge funds purchase convertibles at a discount, that discount is not significantly larger than the discount given to other investors in convertibles. This finding is consistent with convertible bond issues to hedge funds being a low-cost way of distributing equity exposure, rather than the last resort financing opportunity open to the issuers.
The establishment of short positions by hedge funds
Choi, Getmansky, and Tookes (2009) compute the actual monthly change in short interest. 27 We are able to observe the actual change in monthly short interest at the time of issue for 308 of the convertible bonds in our sample. The correlation between expected changes and actual changes is 66.4% (significant at the 1% level). This high correlation coefficient implies that the contemporaneous jump in short interest is in fact the result of hedge fund hedging.
The potential maintenance of short positions by hedge funds
If hedge funds are least-cost distributors of equity exposure a question arises as to how long hedge funds maintain their ownership of a newly issued bond; i.e., for how long 27 As the cutoff date of the monthly short interest numbers is three trading days prior to the 15 th of each month, we carefully assign the convertible issues to the relevant short interest month (as in Bechmann, 2004) . might hedge funds bear the cost of maintaining a short position? If hedge funds were to never sell convertible bonds on to non-hedge fund investors, they would need to hedge for the realized life of the bond. While a convertible bond can survive until its notional maturity, the issuer may go bankrupt. 28 Or, the convertible holder may voluntarily convert or a call may force conversion. Finally, the convertible holder may exercise a put option inherent in some bonds. Therefore, in order to determine an upper bound on just how long hedge funds may remain short in an issuer's stock, we investigate how long convertible issues survive in practice.
Using balance sheet data (Compustat Item DCVT) we determine the fraction of a convertible still outstanding in the five years after issue. We examine only instances where the firm did not already have convertibles outstanding (from an earlier offering) at the time of issue since we are unable to assign aggregate reductions in a firm's convertibles outstanding to particular issues. We assign a missing value code to a particular year for a given bond if a second convertible bond is issued by that firm. We also assign a missing value code if the firm no longer exists.
[ please insert Table 6 here ] Table 6 reports the average (across the non-missing data) of the percentage of the original issue still outstanding each year after issue. This average is likely to be an upward biased estimate of the fraction of a convertible issue that actually survives for two reasons. First, if a firm no longer exists its convertible bonds may have effectively 28 Interestingly, in court-administered reorganizations convertible bondholders have at times been awarded only the same amount as that awarded to the holder of the number of shares the bond was convertible into; i.e., bondholders were effectively forced to convert just when they would have most valued down-side protection.
"matured" as a result of bankruptcy. Or a firm may no longer exist because it has been taken-over, in which case the bondholders may have voluntarily converted. Second, instances where a firm makes a second convertible bond issue may be cases where the first bond was called (and the holders were forced to convert). In both of these events, 0%
of the issue remains outstanding. The number of observations used in calculating the average each year is reported in parentheses. In forming subsamples, we determine whether a convertible bond issue fell into the below-median or the above-median hedge fund involvement subsample. We do not consider the minority and majority hedge fund involvement distinction in this analysis because of the limited number of observations with minority hedge fund involvement (only 5 observations with minority hedge fund involvement have a value for "% outstanding after 5 years").
On average no more than 13.38% of convertibles are still outstanding five years after issue. For bonds with above-median issuance to hedge funds, the average survivorship rate after five years declines to 7.82%. Since the mean (median) time to maturity at issuance of our sample of 629 privately-placed convertible bond issues is 15.26 years (20 years), we can conclude that the effective life of convertible bonds privately-placed with hedge funds is much less than their notional maturity.
29,30
29 The conversion of a high fraction of the convertible bonds issued is consistent with the sample's mean (median) conversion premium at the time of issue of 33.81% (30%). The conversion premium is the excess of the conversion price over the stock price expressed as a percentage of the stock price. Equivalently, the conversion premium is the face value of the bond relative to its conversion value at the time of issue. 30 We have also examined how short interest changes in the years after a convertible's issue. This analysis can potentially provide insights into how long hedge funds maintain their short positions. Although the results seem to indicate that the initial increase in short interest has evaporated 5 years after the issue, changes in short interest can be quite volatile. The analysis is also complicated as the expected short positions of arbitrageurs change when the firm's stock price changes (due to changes in the delta-neutral position), and changes in short interest can also be caused by the arrival of new information about the firm. As mentioned in Section 2.1, another downside of focusing on short interest is that the initial increase in short interest around the issue date could be partly due to valuation shorting by those who believe their information is not appropriately reflected in prices.
Conclusion
Although the majority of buyers in the convertible market are not hedge funds, we find that hedge funds account on average for 73.4% of the proceeds of privately-placed convertible issues, and the bulk of capital raised via convertibles is via private-placement.
The typical hedge fund buyer is involved in a larger number of new issues of convertibles than is the typical non-hedge fund buyer. Also, the typical hedge fund buyer invests more in any particular new convertible than the typical non-hedge fund buyer invests.
We exploit the variation in hedge fund involvement across issues to show that investor identity matters in the convertible debt market. We argue that firms with high costs of seasoned equity offerings privately place convertibles with hedge funds. These hedge funds simultaneously short stock so as to hedge themselves against changes in the Although we find that firms attracting hedge fund investors have a higher chance of bankruptcy and more volatile stock returns, we do not find that these firms offer higher discounts on their convertibles. This is in line with hedge funds serving as relatively cheap distributors and not as hedge funds being investors of last resort. The difference with the findings of Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009) , who study PIPE issuers and do find evidence for the last resort hypothesis, can be explained by differences in the issuers of PIPEs and convertibles. PIPE issuers are generally very small and distressed firms, while the convertible issuers in our sample are much larger. The firms in our sample choose to issue convertibles to hedge funds because this is their least-cost financing choice, not because it is their only choice.
Appendix A: Description of variables
Amihud Liquidity. The Amihud (2002) measure for liquidity is the daily average of a firm's absolute return over trading dollar volume in the year before the offering (× 10 6 ).
We use CRSP data to calculate this variable. A high Amihud score denotes illiquidity.
Call spread overlay. A dummy variable equaling one if the convertible is issued with a call spread overlay, and zero otherwise. In a call spread overlay, the issuer purchases a call option that mimics the call option embedded in the convertible bond and simultaneously writes a call option on the same number of underlying shares at a higher strike price. The net effect is analogous to issuing a convertible bond with a higher conversion price. We obtain information on call spread overlays from the issue prospectuses.
Callable. A dummy variable equaling one if the convertible has a call feature, and zero otherwise. We obtain call information from SDC.
Cash settlement. A dummy variable equaling one if the convertible can potentially be settled in cash, and zero otherwise. Settlement information is obtained from the issue prospectuses, as in Lewis and Verwijmeren (2009) . Securities that contain cash settlement features include one of the following conversion choices. Either an issuer 1) must pay the conversion value (the number of shares a bondholder is entitled to receive times the stock price at the conversion date) in cash (Instrument A); 2) may choose to pay either fully in cash or the number of shares a bondholder is entitled to receive (Instrument B), 3) must pay cash for the accreted value (principal value plus accrued interest) and may satisfy the conversion spread (the excess of the conversion value over the accreted value) in either cash or equity (Instrument C or net share settlements), or 4) may pay any combination of cash and equity (Instrument X), but often there is a stated policy to settle in cash.
Delta. Delta is the convertible's sensitivity for small stock price changes and is calculated
where N(•) is the cumulative probability under a standard normal distribution, S is the price of the underlying stock measured at day 5 (from CRSP), X is the conversion price (from SDC), r is the yield on a 10-year US Treasury Bond (from Datastream), δ is the continuously-compounded dividend yield calculated as Compustat Item DVC divided by the equity market value (Item PRCC_C x CSHO), σ is the annualized stock return volatility, estimated with ten years of monthly stock return data (from CRSP), and T represents the stated maturity of the convertible as of its issuance date (from SDC). We set the dividend yield to zero if the convertible is protected from dividend payments.
Delta-neutral short position. The delta-neutral short position is the total number of common shares that buyers of the convertible issue have to short to obtain a deltaneutral position. This number of shares can be calculated as (Calamos, 2003) Put rights. A dummy variable equaling one if the convertible has a put feature, and zero otherwise. We obtain put information from SDC.
Relative size. A measure of the additional equity exposure being distributed compared to the initial equity exposure. When comparing convertible bonds with each other we measure relative size as the ratio of the delta-neutral short position to the shares outstanding. When comparing convertible issues to hedge funds with seasoned equity offerings we measure relative size as the ratio of the issue proceeds to the market value of equity.
Return volatility. Volatility is calculated as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return data (from CRSP) for ten years of data (or for a shorter period if ten years of data are not available; we set the minimum requirement to twelve months of data).
Stock repurchase. A dummy variable equaling one if the convertible issue is combined with a stock repurchase. This is the case if either the firm announces that it uses part of the proceeds of the convertible issue to repurchase stock (in SDC or Factiva), or if both transactions are announced separately on the same date (in Factiva). Table 5 . Hedge fund involvement and offering discounts
The sample period is January 2000 -March 2008. Issues by utilities and financial institutions are excluded. Panel A reports the offering discount for our overall sample, issues in which the majority of the convertible is bought by hedge funds, and issues in which the minority of the convertible is bought by hedge funds. The offering discount is the difference between the theoretical price and the offer price relative to the theoretical price. Theoretical prices are calculated using MATLAB's pricing algorithm: http://www.mathworks.com/access/helpdesk/help/toolbox/finfixed/cbprice.html.
The difference in means t-statistic does not assume equal variances for the two samples being compared. Panel B presents the estimated relation between the offering discount and the involvement of hedge funds. In Model 1 and 2 we estimate an OLS regression model; Model 2 excludes convertible bonds that have put features attached. In Model 3 we estimate a two-stage model. The first stage of the two-stage model consists of a probit model in which the dependant variable is a dummy corresponding to instances where the majority of the issue is purchased by hedge funds and the explanatory variables are various issuer and issue characteristics (similar to the regressions reported in Table 3 ). We calculate the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage estimation as in Heckman (1979) and include this ratio as an additional control variable in the second-stage regression. See Appendix A for a description of the issue and issuer characteristics. We report standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
